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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the role of minimum wages in determining school enrolment
(educational investment) in Indonesia using the National Socioeconomic Survey
(Susenas). It finds that minimum wage legislation has a negative and significant
substitution eﬀect on educational investment. Individuals are more likely to drop
out of senior secondary school as a result of a minimum wage legislation. Even
though the response among low-income households is positive, this result may be
generated by a fall in the probability of obtaining low-skilled employment, which
oﬀset the substitution eﬀect.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In an eﬀort to improve the living standards of the poor and to reduce inequality, the
minimum wage policy has been proposed and implemented not only in developed
but also in developing countries. However, the policy has been politically
contentious among policymakers and controversial among economists, where
the debate on the implications of wage floors persists. Although there has been a
growing number of studies on minimum wage, most studies focus predominantly
on its employment eﬀects (see Brown et al., 1982; Card and Krueger, 1993; Neumark
and Wascher, 2007). In fact, apart from the analysis based on the firm and labour
market, households should be considered an important channel for explaining
the eﬀect of minimum wage policy, since household behavioural adjustment can
generate substantial changes in the economy. In the view that households act as
the supplier of labour, a household’s decision on educational investment—which
affects human capital, and thus the quality of labour supplied—is an essential
channel to explain the minimum wage effect.
Neumark and Wascher (1994) find that the eﬀect of minimum wage on
employment is sensitive to the introduction of schooling control, highlighting the
importance of examining the linkages among minimum wage, employment, and
enrolment. Using US state–year observations between 1977 and 1989, Neumark
and Wascher (1994) identify a negative influence of minimum wage on school
enrolment and a positive influence on the proportion of teenagers neither
employed nor in school. This adverse eﬀect of minimum wage on schooling is
also confirmed by a series of studies including Chaplin et al. (2003) for the US,
Landon (1997) for Canada, Pacheco (2007) for New Zealand, and Rice (2010) for
the UK. In contrast, Mattila (1978), using time-series data based on the US Current
Population Survey, finds that minimum wage induces enrolment rates. Similarly,
Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982) suggest that there is an increase in the educational
attainment of white-teens from higher-income families as a response to minimum
wage legislation in the US. Cahuc and Michel (1996) also show that minimum wage
could positively impact growth by inducing more human capital accumulation,
acting as a way of reducing unemployment caused by low demand for unskilled
workers.
The limited research that attempts to address the relationship between
minimum wage and educational attainment, as well as the lack of universal
consensus among previous research, indicates a serious research gap in the
literature (Cahuc and Michel, 1996; Chaplin et al., 2003; Ehrenberg and Marcus,
1982; Landon, 1997; Mattila, 1978; Neumark and Wascher, 1994; Pacheco, 2007;
Rice, 2010). Moreover, earlier research has some limitations, including the lack of
variation in the minimum wage and potential endogeneity bias due to the inability
to control for some explanatory variables (see Neumark and Wascher, 1994). Most
existing studies were also conducted in developed countries, and only a few
studies have been carried out in developing countries (Chaplin et al., 2003; Landon,
1997; Pacheco, 2007; Rice, 2010). To the best of my recollection, there is no previous
study investigating the impact of minimum wage legislation on the choice of senior
secondary school type, particularly from a developing country’s perspective.
Therefore, to fill this research gap, this paper investigates the relationship between
minimum wage and educational (or human capital) investment—particularly on
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss2/3
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choosing whether or not to attend school, and later the choice of the school type or
the employment type—at the individual level, in the Indonesian context.
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it further
investigates the indirect implication of minimum wage by introducing household
decisions on educational investment. Second, by using a rich household survey
from the National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas), this paper tries to capture
minimum wage eﬀects at the individual level, which may not be detected by statelevel regressions used in most previous research. Furthermore, this paper can
be viewed as an eﬀort to analyse whether the minimum wage policy supports
or impedes recent Indonesian government eﬀorts to promote school enrolment
through its twelve-year compulsory education program1. It is worth noting that the
government may be unaware of the possible interaction between diﬀerent policies,
especially in a developing country where inter-sectoral policy coordination is very
limited.
Indonesia poses as an intriguing case study for analysing the eﬀects of minimum
wage for a number of reasons. First, although the first minimum wage legislation
introduced in the early 1970s was neither binding nor enforced, the government
implemented a new minimum wage legislation in 1989 and started to aggressively
promote minimum wage policies as a vital labour policy (Hohberg and Lay, 2015).
Second, the minimum wage setting’s responsibility is delegated to each of the
34 provincial governments that revise their own minimum wage annually. This
reform to the minimum wage, which occurred in 2001, has provided substantial
variation in minimum wage data to investigate the impact of the minimum wage
policy. Finally, Indonesia’s more decentralized political process for the past few
years is expected to yield greater variation in regional policies, including those
related to the minimum wage (Chun and Khor, 2010).
Because the theoretical predictions on the choice of school enrolment are
ambiguous, empirical analysis is, therefore, necessary to untangle the complex
theoretical relationship between minimum wage and school choice. This study
pursues this objective using a large-scale annual household survey from Susenas
as the primary data source. Specifically, using the survey data from 2000 to 2018,
I construct a pooled cross-sectional dataset of individuals. The sample includes
individuals who completed junior secondary education, and then choose either
to attend senior secondary school or to drop out of school. The study utilises a
nested logit model with controls for the individual- and household-explanatory
variables to capture the possible relationship between minimum wage and choice
of school enrolment. I find that the minimum wage legislation has a negative
and significant substitution eﬀect on educational investment. That is, individuals
are more likely to drop out of senior secondary school as a result of a minimum
wage legislation. Despite a positive outcome among low-income households, a
regression incorporating an interaction term suggests that the substitution eﬀect is
still the dominant factor in explaining the eﬀect of minimum wage.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II outlines the economic
framework underlying the empirical approach, whereas Section III describes the
1

Government Regulation (PP) No.47/2008 on Compulsory Education: https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/
Home/Details/4861/pp-no-47-tahun-2008
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data and methodology used in the estimations. Section IV contains the analysis and
discussion of the eﬀect of an increase in the minimum wage on school enrolment.
Finally, Section V concludes the paper and provides policy recommendations.
II. A SIMPLE TWO-PERIOD MODEL OF HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT
The economic framework, which formalises the relationship between minimum
wage and choice of school enrolment, is based on a simple two-period model of
human capital investment. This model is developed based on Acemoglu and Autor
(2000) and Acemoglu and Pischke (2001), which are also inspired by Becker (1964)
and Becker and Tomes (1986) theoretical models of investment in human capital.
Consider a household that consists of one adult and one child. In period one,
an adult, who lives for just one period, works and earns income yi (either highskilled or minimum wage), consumes ci1, and decides whether to invest in his/her
child’s education ei. The total cost—including the opportunity cost—of sending a
child to school is θi, which varies with i as there is heterogeneity among children.
Meanwhile, in period two, the child becomes an adult, has a child of his/her own,
consumes ci2 and earns the wage of a low-skilled worker (minimum wage rate)
if he/she did not attend school, wl, or the wage of a high-skilled worker if he/she
attended school, wh.
According to the two-period model set up above, the utility of household i is
given as:
(1)
where β is a parameter that measures how important future (child’s) consumption
is to current consumption. Following the ‘separation theorem’ for human capital
investment, the decision on school enrolment will be made simply to maximise the
budget set of the household; hence, ei does not appear in the objective function. In
the case of a perfect capital market in which the adult can borrow for his/her child
with an interest rate r, the decision problem of the adult is therefore to maximise
household utility subject to the household budget constraint, which is given as:
(2)
For an adult to send his/her child to school and to invest in his/her education,
the following equation must be satisfied:
(3)
which asserts that the cost of schooling θi must be less than or equal to the net
present value of the skill premium wh-wl obtained from enrolling at school.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss2/3
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For this solution to hold, it should be noted, strong assumptions including
a fully altruistic parent (the parent is willing to borrow to finance the child’s
education or β = 1) and the absence of credit market problems (such as informational/
contractual problems) are required. However, in practice, credit market problems
are prevalent, especially in the context of a developing country. In Indonesia,
Johnston and Morduch (2008) find that, out of 40 percent of creditworthy poor
households, only 10 percent recently borrowed from a traditional bank, suggesting
a large gap between financial use and creditworthiness. In that case, it is important
to take into account the credit market problems in the model setup. In this scenario,
it is assumed that the adult is either unable or unwilling to borrow. Thus, saving
cannot be negative or to simplify, saving is zero in both periods. This modifies the
budget set as follows:
(4a)
(4b)
Furthermore, the utilities from sending and not sending the child to a school
are given, respectively, by:
(5a)
(5b)
Hence, an adult will send his/her child to school if the following condition is
satisfied:
(6)
(7)
Besides the household’s optimality specified in Equation (7), another constraint
on school enrolment decision is the condition that household income in each
period cannot be less than the minimum subsistence level (Wongsangaroonsri,
2016). The arbitrary minimum basket of consumption for a household is c̅i, which
varies across households, to consider household-specific consumption preference.
It is assumed that wl≥c̅i and without access to the credit market, the household that
earns income at the minimum wage level is bound to this additional constraint:
(8)
As a response to an increase in the minimum wage, conditions (7) and (8)
generate two opposing impacts on the choice of senior secondary school type.
According to Equation (7), a higher level of minimum wage decreases the skill
premium because it increases the wage of the low-skilled worker. As a result, the
minimum wage legislation reduces the net benefit of sending a child to a school
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021
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and induces a child to drop out of school (substitution eﬀect). On the other hand,
an increase in the minimum wage causes the income constraint in condition (8) to
become less binding; hence, the child will be more likely to enrol at school (income
eﬀect). In addition to the direct impact of minimum wage on wage (supply side), the
school choice decision is also influenced by the indirect impact of minimum wage
on employment probability. This impact also consists of two conflicting forces,
depending on the labour market structure (demand side). Under the competitive
labour market, the substitution of low-skilled for the high-skilled workers—due
to an increase in the minimum wage—will increase the net benefit of investing
in human capital and give rise to students’ enrolment at school. Meanwhile, in
the monopsonistic labour market, the higher probability of getting a job reduces
the incentive to invest further in education, thus inducing students to drop out of
school.
Therefore, the total eﬀect of an increase in minimum wage will depend on the
combination of its impact on wage and employment probability. For example, if
the substitution eﬀect of the minimum wage is oﬀset by a fall in the probability of
obtaining low-skilled employment, the child will be more likely to enrol at school.
Conversely, suppose the adverse eﬀect on employment is small or the probability
of employment increases. In that case, the increase in the minimum wage will raise
the opportunity cost of going to school, and the child will be more likely to drop
out of school.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data Characteristics
A large-scale annual household survey from Susenas, covering approximately
300,000 households in Indonesia’s 34 provinces, serves as the primary data
source for this paper. It contains a core questionnaire consisting of a household
roster listing the sex, age, marital status, and the educational attainment of all
household members. The survey is supplemented by modules covering additional
information such as health care and nutrition, household income and expenditure,
and labour force experience. Meanwhile, the macroeconomic variables, including
the provincial nominal minimum wage, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) price
deflator, and poverty line, are obtained from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics.
The provincial real minimum wage variable is created by dividing the provincial
nominal minimum wage with provincial GDP price deflator in each year to index
the variable in terms of 2010 rupiah. Besides, the household expenditure is adjusted
spatially and temporally by multiplying the nominal household expenditure with
the average national poverty line in the base year, and then dividing the result by
the provincial poverty line.
Using the survey data from 2000 to 2018, I construct a pooled cross-sectional
dataset of individuals. Our sample includes individuals who completed junior
secondary education, and then choose either to attend senior secondary education or
to drop out of school. Starting from 2015, the Indonesian government implemented
the twelve-year compulsory education program, which was nine-year in the
previous years. However, this program’s take-up is still meagre; the drop-out
rate at junior secondary school is still the highest compared to other educational
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss2/3
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levels (for instance, 51,200 students dropped out in 2017/2018 as reported by the
Ministry of National Education and Culture2). Therefore, it is assumed that the
schooling choice is made when students completed junior secondary school. In
addition, the sample chosen for this study is individuals at the age of 15 to 21
during the survey year, as these are the times when students are enrolled in senior
secondary school. The choice of the lower age cut-oﬀ is in line with the definition
of the working-age population, in which it is defined as those aged from 15 to 64
according to the Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics. Meanwhile, the upper
age cut-off is in accordance with the Regulation of the Minister of Education and
Culture (Permendikbud) No.44/2019 Article 73, stating that one of the requirements
for new student candidates for grade 10 senior secondary school high school
is that candidates have to be at the maximum age of 21 years on July 1 of the
particular academic year. To avoid endogeneity, individuals who migrated across
the province are not included in the analysis as the migration might be motivated
by incentives to pursue a higher minimum wage.
The dependent variable of this study is the choice of human capital investment
after completing junior secondary school, which is categorised into two choice
types: to attend senior secondary school or to drop out of school. Under the subset
of “attending senior secondary school”, there are two choices: attending general
or vocational senior secondary. Individuals attending general senior secondary
schools are those enrolled in Sekolah Menengah Atas (SMA) and Madrasah Aliyah
(MA), equivalent to general senior secondary school but under the Ministry of
Religion’s management. Meanwhile, individuals attending vocational senior
secondary schools are those enrolled in Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan (SMK)
and Madrasah Aliyah Kejuruan (MAK). On the other hand, within the subset of
“dropping out of school”, there are two alternatives: work at a formal sector
or not at a formal sector. Individuals categorised with formal employment are
self-employed with unpaid family or temporary workers in the non-agricultural
industry, self-employed with permanent workers, government and private-sector
workers. Meanwhile, individuals categorised with non-formal employment are
those working in the informal sector (self-employed, unpaid family workers, selfemployed with unpaid or temporary workers in the agricultural industry, and
casual workers), taking care of the household, and doing other activities besides
personal routines.
The variable of interest is the log value of the annual real minimum wage,
set at the provincial level. Some control variables included in the analysis are
gender, age, marital status, and urban residency dummy. Household-level control
variables in the analysis are mother’s and father’s highest educational attainment,
household size, number of children in the household disaggregated based on age
(1-5, 5-15, and above 15 years old), and the log value of real monthly household
expenditure, disaggregated into food and non-food expenditures. To ensure the
comparability of real monthly household expenditure variable across diﬀerent
in the sense that the marginal cost of living
family sizes, the value is divided by
2
3

Indonesia educational statistics: http://statistik.data.kemdikbud.go.id/
Permendikbud No.44/2019: https://jdih.kemdikbud.go.id/arsip/Permendikbud%20Nomor%2044%20
Tahun%202019.pdf
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is decreasing as the number of household members is increasing. Moreover, to
reflect employment availability in the labour market, the estimation also controls
for provincial level unemployment rate. These control variables at the individual
and household levels are the case-specific variables for the first decision level
in the nested logit model use in this study. Equally important, the share of each
alternative at the district level poses as the alternative-specific variable, which
varies among the bottom-level alternatives, the four choices that one could make
after completing junior secondary school.
As information about senior secondary school choice is only observed once
during a person’s lifetime (unless the student has to repeat grade and transfer to
another school), a panel dataset cannot be constructed, and a fixed eﬀects model
at the individual level cannot be used for the analysis. Besides, to the best of my
knowledge, a plausible instrument for minimum wage is not available. Therefore,
to limit potential sources of endogeneity in the regression due to omitted variables,
it is crucial to control for as many predetermined or exogenous characteristics as
possible. Despite these limitations, compared to pure cross-sectional and timeseries data, the independently pooled cross-sectional data oﬀers some advantages,
including more precise estimators due to the availability of more observations
and the ability to trace the evolution of the dependent variable over time after
controlling for confounders. Moreover, as the data is collected independently
of each other across clusters, serial correlation of residuals is not an issue when
applying the regression analysis.
B. Methodology
A nested logit model with controls for the individual- and household-explanatory
variables to capture the possible relationship between minimum wage and choice
of school enrolment is utilised for the analysis. This nested logit model allows
for a non-zero correlation between unobserved components of choices within a
nest and maintains zero correlation across nests (Heiss, 2002). Hence, this model
relaxes the assumption of independently distributed errors and the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which implies proportional substitution across
alternatives, inherent in conditional and multinomial logit models by clustering
similar alternatives into nests (Train, 2009). In this paper, an individual’s choices
after completing Junior Secondary School (JSS) are grouped by choice type: to
attend Senior Secondary School (SSS) or to drop out of school. The tree structure
of an individual’s decision about what he/she wants to do after completing junior
secondary school is presented in Figure 1. The tree diagram consists of two
branches, labelled “Attend SSS” and “Drop out”, for the two subsets of alternatives,
and each of the branches contains two twigs for the two alternatives within the
subset. There is proportional substitution across twigs within a branch but not
across branches.
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Figure 1.
Tree Diagram for Choices after Completing JSS
This figure shows the tree structure of an individual’s choices after completing Junior Secondary School (JSS), which
are grouped by choice type: to attend Senior Secondary School (SSS) or to drop out of school.

Complete JSS

Attend SSS

General School

Vocational School

Drop Out

Formal
Employment

Non-formal
Employment

The nested logit model is estimated according to the following specification:
(9)

The dependent variable schl_choicei,t is a dummy variable that takes a value
of zero if an individual i drops out of school and one if an individual i enrols at
senior secondary school. The independent variable is lnMWj,t, where MWj,t is the
real minimum wage of province j at time t. Xi,t, Xh,t, and Xj,t are each vector of
individual-, household-, and province-specific control variables. The parameters
of the nested logit model are estimated by the simultaneous maximum likelihood
technique, which, under fairly general conditions, generates consistent and eﬃcient
values of the parameters (Brownstone and Small, 1989). A positive value of the
parameter π1 indicates that an increase in the minimum wage is associated with
an increase in the likelihood of senior secondary school enrolment. Meanwhile,
a negative value of the parameter π1 suggests that a hike in the minimum wage
is linked to a drop in the probability of enrolling at senior secondary school, i.e.,
the individual is more like to drop out of school. The nested logit model in this
study has two decision levels. In the first level, a type of choice is made—to enrol
at senior secondary school or to drop out of school—and, in the second level, a
specific alternative is chosen.
The nested logit model generalizes the multinomial logit model, allowing
groups of alternatives to be similar in an unobserved way (Heiss, 2002). In the
case of the two-level nested logit, as in this paper, it is assumed that there are J
choices of alternatives {0,1,2,…,J} nested into S sets {B1,B2,…,Bs}. The conditional
probability of choice j given the choice in the set Bs becomes:
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021
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(10)
for j ∈ Bs, and zero otherwise. In addition, the marginal probability of a choice in
the set Bs is as follows:
(11)
If ρs=1 for all s, then:
(12)
Thus, the implied joint distribution function of the εi,j is:
(13)
ρs indicates the degree of independence of alternatives within the nest, and 1-ρs
is a measure of correlation within the nest. Meanwhile, between the sets, εi,j are
independent, in which ρs=1. When all correlations are zero, the nested logit model
becomes the standard logit model.
The effect of minimum wage legislation on human capital investment relies
on the firm’s compliance level. In this respect, the government of Indonesia makes
efforts to ensure that minimum wage laws are binding. According to Law No.
13 of 2003 concerning Manpower4, violating the minimum wage provision is a
criminal offense and employers are threatened with a minimum of one year and
a maximum of four years imprisonment and/or a minimum fine of Rp100 million
(approximately US$ 6.8 thousand) and a maximum of Rp 400 million (approximately
US$ 27 thousand). In addition to the law on Manpower, regulations regarding
wages are also contained in Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah/PP) No.
78 of 2015 concerning Wages/Remuneration5, Regulation of Minister of Manpower
(Permenaker) No. 1 of 2017 concerning Wage Structure and Scale6, and Permenaker
No. 15 of 2018 concerning Minimum Wages7. However, in practice, firms’ primary
motivation to comply with the minimum wage legislation is the possibility of
labour strikes, which could disrupt the production process and the possibility of
consumers boycotting the firms, affecting the firms’ sales and revenue.

4
5
6
7

UU No.13/2003: https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/43013
PP No.78/2015: https://jdih.kemnaker.go.id/data_puu/PP_Nomor_78_Tahun_2015(1).pdf
Permenaker No.1/2017: https://jdih.kemnaker.go.id/data_wirata/wirata-4-1-2017.pdf
Permenaker No.15/2018: https://jdih.kemnaker.go.id/data_puu/Permen_15_2018.pdf
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Figure 2.
Kernel Density of Monthly Salary/Wage Distribution, 2000 and 2018
This figure displays the kernel density of Indonesia’s salary distribution, as reported by Sakernas in 2000 and 2018.
The evident spike in the salary distribution around the nominal minimum wage is observed each year, indicating that
the minimum wage legislation, to a certain extent, has affected the salary distribution. This data is obtained from the
National Labour Force Survey (Sakernas), 2000 and 2018.
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In addition, to ascertain that the regulation concerning minimum wage
imposed by the government is binding, I performed further examination on the
distribution of workers’ wages and how it interacts with the minimum wage level.
Figure 2 displays the kernel density of the salary distribution in Indonesia, as
reported by Sakernas in 2000 and 2018, which were chosen since the survey data
used in the analysis are from 2000 to 2018. The national average of the nominal
minimum wage is depicted by the red vertical line. In this case, an evident spike in
the salary distribution around the nominal minimum wage is observed each year,
indicating that the minimum wage legislation, to a certain extent, has affected
the salary distribution. The proportion of workers who received wages above the
minimum wage amounts to 91 percent in 2000. Yet, it decreased to 63 percent in
2018, along with a significant increase in the minimum wage level. Despite firms’
imperfect compliance on minimum wage—since a proportion of workers is still
receiving wage below the minimum wage—the evidence shown in Figure 2 could
sufficiently become the foundation that allows the analysis using minimum wage.
IV. MAIN FINDINGS
A. Minimum Wage Eﬀect on Choice of Senior Secondary School Type
Table 1 presents the eﬀect of minimum wage legislation on the choice of human
capital investment, estimated using Equation (9). Column (1) contains the estimate
for the full sample, Columns (2) and (3) show the estimates when the sample is
disaggregated by gender, whereas Columns (4) and (5) display the estimates when
the sample is subdivided based on household income.
Table 1.
The Eﬀect of Minimum Wage on the Choice of Human Capital Investment
This table reports the estimates using the nested logit model for the full sample and when the sample is disaggregated
by gender and household income. Dependent Variable is the Choice of Human Capital Investment (0=Drop Out of
School; 1= Enrol at Senior Secondary School). Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are in the parentheses. *, **,
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All estimations include all the control
variables described in Section III as well as year and province fixed effects.

Log (minimum wage)
Odds ratio
Wald χ2
Log likelihood
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

Baseline

Male

Female

-.187**
(.089)
.829
766.07
-2039.51
11,088

-.083
(.128)
.920
612.00
-1162.79
5,616

-.377**
(.128)
.685
436.01
-959.55
5,472

(4)
Low
Income

(5)
High
Income

.207***
(.059)
1.229
2992.19
-12152.83
5,292

-.018
(.134)
.981
395.93
-1100.89
5,796

Based on the estimation using the nested logit model, the estimated eﬀect of
minimum wage is negative and statistically significant at a 5 percent significance
level for the full sample regression. The coeﬃcient of the nested logit estimation
is in terms of log odds. When the outcome is converted to odds ratio by taking the
exponent, it could be inferred that the odds are 0.83 to 1 (17 percent decrease in the
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odds) that parents will invest in their children’s education with e (or approximately
2.718) times increase in the minimum wage.8 This result suggests that an increase
in the minimum wage is associated with lower odds to enrol at senior secondary
school. The finding of this negative eﬀect is also in accordance with the previous
studies conducted by Neumark and Wascher (1994), Landon (1997), Pacheco
(2007), and Rice (2010).
Furthermore, to capture gender diﬀerences in the eﬀect of minimum wage,
the sample is disaggregated into male and female. There is no significant effect
of minimum wage for the male sample regression, indicating that deciding
whether to attend senior secondary school is not influenced by the minimum wage
legislation. Meanwhile, when the same regression is carried out using the female
sample, the results indicate a negative eﬀect of minimum wage on educational
investment, which is significant at the 5 percent level. The odds are 0.68 to 1 (32
percent decrease in the odds) that parents will invest in their female children’s
education with e times increase in the minimum wage.
There are two possible explanations for this negative result in the female
sample. First, the substitution eﬀect could be dominant, as shown in Equation
(7). Thus, a female child will have a higher probability of dropping out of senior
secondary school as the minimum wage legislation reduces the skill premium and
the net benefit of sending a female child to school. Second, the income eﬀect could
be larger than the substitution eﬀect but then it is oﬀset by a rise in the probability
of obtaining a low-skilled employment; hence, an increase in the minimum wage
is accompanied by higher odds of a female child dropping out of senior secondary
school.
Statistically, at the 5 percent significance level, the disaggregation reveals that
the odds ratio among male children is 31 percent higher than that of female children
to enrol at senior secondary school due to the minimum wage increase.9 This result
indicates that female children are more likely to drop out of school and to start
working, either in the formal or informal sector, as minimum wage increases.
This could be explained by the entrenched cultural norms concerning women’s
role in society, particularly in many developing countries. Besides, rooted norms
on gender division of labour in which women are supposed to take care of the
domestic work will most likely bias education investment towards males (Dreze
and Sen, 1995; Davies and Zhang, 1995; Chen et al., 2009). In Indonesia, although
there is no evidence of son preference in birth spacing, Kevane and Levine (2003)
suggest that gender differences in educational attainment—particularly in senior
secondary and tertiary education—and inheritance were quite prevalent in the
recent past.
Furthermore, the sample is subdivided by household income proxied using
household expenditure data, which was timely and spatially standardised
to generate comparable figures across time and province in Indonesia. This
disaggregation is crucial to analyse possible diﬀerences in the eﬀect of minimum
8

9

The odds ratio is associated with a b-fold increase in the predictor, where b is the base of the logarithm
used when log-transforming the predictor.
Odds ratio among male children is 1 because there is no significant result on the effect of minimum
wage legislation on senior secondary school enrolment. Hence, in this case, the condition whether to
attend senior secondary school is equally likely to occur.
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wage between low-income and high-income households in the sample. The
intuition is that the eﬀect of the positive income shock would be more likely to aﬀect
households with income below the minimum wage rate. Conversely, households
with income that lies well above the minimum wage rate should experience none
or comparatively smaller eﬀect on their income. For this purpose, a low-income
household is defined as a household that receives real monthly income less or
equal to the equivalent value of 800,000 rupiahs in 2010, while any household
with income above this threshold is defined as a high-income household. This
subdivision threshold is also consistent with the average of the real minimum
wage in 2010, which is 845,707 rupiah. We separately run the regression based
on household income status, and present the results in Columns (4) and (5). The
estimate of minimum wage eﬀect is negative for individuals in the high-income
households and yet positive for individuals in low-income households.
According to the estimates using the nested logit model, the estimated eﬀect of
minimum wage is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent significance
level for the low-income sample regression. If it is interpreted using the odds
ratio, I could conclude that the odds are 1.22 to 1 (22 percent increase in the odds)
that parents will invest in their children’s education with e times increase in the
minimum wage. Meanwhile, when the same regression is carried out using the
high-income sample, I find no significant eﬀect of minimum wage on educational
investment. The significant positive eﬀect of minimum wage legislation among
the low-income households indicates that an increase in the minimum wage is
associated with a higher probability to enrol at senior secondary school. This
result is in accordance with the theoretical prediction that the budget constraint in
condition (8) is more likely to be binding for the low-income households; hence a
positive income shock will make it less binding resulting in a higher probability
of investing in senior secondary education. Moreover, the result is also consistent
with the intuition that individuals in households at the lower end of the income
distribution are more sensitive to an increase in the minimum wage.
Nevertheless, among the low-income households, it cannot be concluded
that the income eﬀect is the dominant factor (relative to the substitution eﬀect) as
this positive result may be generated by a fall in the probability of obtaining lowskilled employment that oﬀset the substitution eﬀect. In other words, if the labour
market in Indonesia is assumed to be competitive, as suggested by Suryahadi
et al. (2003) that firms substituted low-skilled workers for high-skilled workers,
the dominant substitution eﬀect (i.e., to drop out of school) may be superseded
by the lower probability of employment due to a higher minimum wage. As a
result, the probability of enrolling in senior secondary school is higher. In this
regard, Cameron and Alatas (2003), using census data from all medium and
large Indonesian firms, find evidence of an adverse employment impact for small
domestic firms but no employment impact for large firms—foreign or domestic.
This result indicates that smaller firms, in particular, operate in a competitive
labour market in Indonesia.
Although minimum wages may not directly affect low-income households
since a significant proportion of them is engaged in the informal sector10, empirical
According Sakernas 2019, more than 55 percent of workers in Indonesia are involved in informal
sector employment. This rate is higher among poor workers, approximately 65 percent of workers
with income in the bottom 20 percent work in the informal sector.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss2/3
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studies reveal that they play a significant role. As an instance, a study by Khamis
(2013) finds that the rise in the minimum wage has had only a minor effect on the
formal sector in Argentina but has improved wages in the informal sector. This
result indicates that the common practice of non-compliance with labour laws
and standards in the informal economy does not necessarily imply that minimum
wages do not affect. The rationale for the influence of minimum wages on wages
received by informal workers has been the “lighthouse effect” —i.e., a signal
given by the minimum wage legislation to workers and employers in the informal
economy regarding socially acceptable minimum levels of pay (Souza and Baltar,
1979; Bell, 1999). In line with this, a field investigation in Indonesia conducted by
Widarti (2006) observes that the wage system in the informal sector uses wage
references in the regions’ similar businesses; therefore, wages for most workers
in the informal sector are clustered around the minimum wage standards at the
provincial level.
B. Separating the Substitution and Income Eﬀects
Determining the magnitude of substitution and income eﬀect is also of interest
in analysing the eﬀect of minimum wage on educational investment. Several
additional assumptions underlying this identification are needed. First, the
magnitude of the substitution eﬀect is symmetric across low-income and highincome households. Second, as the eﬀect of the positive income shock is more
likely to aﬀect households with income below the minimum wage rate, the income
eﬀect is assumed to aﬀect only low-income households; and, third, the labour
market is competitive so that an increase in the minimum wage is followed by an
adverse eﬀect in employment. To determine the size of substitution and income
eﬀects, I estimate the following regression:

(14)

Low Incomei,t is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the household is
classified as low income (i.e. receiving real monthly income less or equal to the
equivalent value of 800,000 rupiahs in 2010) and 0 if otherwise. According to
Equation (14), π1 will capture the common effect of minimum wage across all
households. Meanwhile, π3, the coefficient of the interaction term, will capture the
additional effect of minimum wage specific to the low-income household. Given
the aforementioned assumptions, π1 will capture the substitution effect for both
households, and thus the sign is expected to be negative, whereas π3 will capture
the income effect for low-income households, and the sign should be positive.
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Table 2.
Alternative Specification with Interaction Term
This table reports the results using the nested logit model with an interaction term. All estimations include all the
control variables described in Section III as well as year and province fixed effects. Dependent Variable is the Choice
of Human Capital Investment (0=Drop Out of School; 1= Enrol at Senior Secondary School)

Coefficient

Standard
Error

z

P >|z|

-0.126
2.538
-0.202

0.026
5.968
0.416

-4.91
0.43
-0.49

0.000
0.671
0.627

Log (minimum wage)
Low Income
Low Income* Log (minimum wage)

Based on the regression specified in Equation (14), Table 2 shows that the
coeﬃcient of log real minimum wage is negative, whereas the coeﬃcient of the
interaction term is insignificant. From these results, it can be inferred that the
substitution eﬀect is dominant for both households, whereas the income eﬀect is
non-existent for low-income households. Hence, the positive and significant effect
of an increase in minimum wage among low-income households, presented in
Column (4) of Table 1, is more likely to be associated with a fall in the probability
of obtaining a low-skilled employment that oﬀset the substitution eﬀect, rather
than with the income eﬀect on its own.
C. Standard Logit or Nested Logit Model
In order to check whether a nested logit model provides an accurate representation
of the substitution pattern, I performed hypothesis tests on the correlations within
a nested logit model (Train, 2009). When all correlations are zero, the generalised
extreme value distribution becomes the product of independent extreme value
distributions, and the nested logit model becomes a standard logit model. In
contrast, if there are correlations over alternatives, the nested logit model is the
appropriate model to be used for the analysis.
The coefficient on the inclusive value (ρs), sometimes called the log-sum
coefficient or the dissimilarity parameter, reflects the degree of independence
among the unobserved portions of utility for the alternatives in each nest. A high
value of ρs means greater independence and less correlation, i.e., the alternatives
in the nest are less similar for unobserved reasons. For a nested logit model to
be consistent with utility-maximising behaviour, it must be the case that 0<ρs<1
for all s. A negative value of ρs is inconsistent with utility maximisation since
it implies that improving the attributes of an alternative actually decreases the
probability that it will be chosen. In general, the estimated log-sum coefficient that
is outside the (0,1] bound suggests a misspecification problem with the model, in
which either the systematic component, the grouping, or both could be incorrectly
specified. Table 3 exhibits that the log-sum coefficients in all nested logit model
specifications satisfy 0<ρs<1 for all s. Thus, it can be inferred that there is no
misspecification problem with the model.
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Table 3.
Dissimilarity Parameters, LR Test, and Hausman Test for IIA
This table reports the dissimilarity parameters, LR test, and Hausman Test for IIA for the full sample and when the
sample is disaggregated by gender and household income. Dependent Variable is the Choice of Human Capital
Investment (0=Drop Out of School; 1= Enrol at Senior Secondary School). Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity
are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All
estimations include all the control variables described in Section III as well as year and province fixed effects.

ρSenior Secondary School
ρDrop Out
LR test for IIA
(H0: ρs=1 ∀ s)
Hausman test for IIA
(H0: ρs=1 ∀ s)

(1)
Baseline

(2)
Male

(3)
Female

(4)
Low Income

(5)
High
Income

.624
.332

.668
.436

.716
.249

.770
.407

.653
.358

26.55***

36.72***

61.59***

98.44***

26.93***

42.38***

44.88***

94.37***

468.14***

33.00***

In addition, to check whether the model has complete independence and the
nested logit reduces to a standard logit model, a Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test is
conducted with the null being that ρs=1 for all s. In the case of this paper, the LR
test results in Table 3 show that the null that all of the dissimilarity parameters
are 1 can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level for all of the nested logit
model specifications. This indicates that the nested logit model is, in fact, more
appropriate to estimate the effect of minimum wage on educational investment
as compared to the standard logit model, especially when the type of senior
secondary school and employment pose as alternatives that one has to choose.
The joint test that ρs=1 for all s can also be seen as a test of the IIA assumption.
If ρs=1 for all s, which means that the IIA holds, then it is appropriate to use
the standard logit model. Nevertheless, the LR test result should be used with
caution as it will depend on exactly how the decision tree is specified. In other
words, different specifications of the decision tree can lead to conflicting results.
Therefore, Hausman’s (1978) specification test can be used to test for IIA, because
this test is not be sensitive to the tree structure specified in the nested logit model.
Table 3 also reports Hausman’s specification test results, which indicate that IIA
does not hold, and thus it is appropriate to use the nested logit model.
D. Disaggregation into High- and Low-income Household
The regressions for low- and high-income households presented in Table 1 use
the sample disaggregated by the equivalent value of Rp 800,000 in 2010 cutoff,
an arbitrary threshold set to examine the heterogeneity of minimum wage
eﬀect based on the household income. To check for robustness, this section
repeats the regression done in Columns (4) and (5) of Table 1 using diﬀerent
sample subdivisions. Table 4 presents the estimates of minimum wage eﬀect on
educational investment when the sample is disaggregated into three groups based
on household income distribution.
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Table 4.
Estimation of Minimum Wages Effect on Educational Investment
Based on the Household Income Distribution
This table reports the results using the nested logit model for the full sample and when the sample is disaggregated
by gender and household income. Dependent Variable is the Choice of Human Capital Investment (0=Drop Out of
School; 1= Enrol at Senior Secondary School). Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are in the parentheses. *, **,
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All estimations include all the control
variables described in Section III as well as year and province fixed effects.

(1)
HH income ≤
5th percentile
Log (Minimum Wages)
Odds ratio
Wald χ2
Log likelihood
Observations

0.249***
(0.0700)
1.282
2174.49
-8695.10
2,439

(2)

(3)
(4)
25 percentile >
HH income ≤
HH income >
HH income ≤
th
25 percentile
50th percentile
th
50 percentile
th

-0.115
(0.0830)
.891
1141.14
-4332.77
2,772

-0.0415
(0.104)
.959
1265.23
-5005.53
2,661

-0.0533
(0.203)
.948
454.46
-975.97
3,216

The threshold for the 5th percentile of household income distribution is the
equivalent value of Rp 817,165 in 2010, whereas the 25th and 50th percentiles of
the distribution are the equivalent values of Rp 1,287,747 and Rp 1,796,012 in
2010, respectively. Column (1) shows that the minimum wage legislation has a
significant positive eﬀect on educational investment. In other words, an increase in
minimum wage induces enrolment in senior secondary school among individuals
in low-income households, particularly those with income below 5 percent of the
distribution. Using the odds ratio, I could conclude that the odds are 1.252 to 1
that parents will invest in their children’s education with e times increase in the
minimum wage. Conversely, Columns (2), (3), and (4) display that there is no
significant eﬀect of minimum wage on educational investment. This is consistent
with the regression estimates for low- and high-income households in Table 1,
indicating that the significant positive eﬀect of minimum wage among the lowincome households is mostly driven by individuals whose household incomes are
at the 5th percentile of the distribution, which is equal to the average value of real
minimum wage in 2010.
E. Construction of Provincial Real Minimum Wage Variable
One could use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) deflator to adjust nominal values to real values. Although it may seem that
both measure the same thing at first glance, there are a few key diﬀerences. The
first is that the GDP deflator includes only domestic goods and not anything that
is imported, whereas the CPI includes anything bought by consumers, including
foreign goods. The second diﬀerence is that the GDP deflator is a measure of the
prices of all goods and services, whereas the CPI is a measure of only goods bought
by consumers. Therefore, this section presents a robustness check, which entails
constructing the provincial real minimum wage variable using CPI as a deflator,
rather than the GDP deflator.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss2/3
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v24i2

18

Pritadrajati: DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOL ENROLMENT IN INDONESIA: THE ROLE OF MINIMU
199

Determinants of School Enrolment in Indonesia: The Role of Minimum Wage

Table 5.
The Eﬀect of Minimum Wage on the Choice of Human Capital Investment
This table reports the results using the nested logit model for the full sample and when the sample is disaggregated
by gender and household income. Dependent Variable is the Choice of Human Capital Investment (0=Drop Out of
School; 1= Enrol at Senior Secondary School). Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are in the parentheses. *, **,
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All estimations include all the control
variables described in Section III as well as year and province fixed effects.

Log (minimum wage)
Odds ratio
Wald χ2
Log likelihood
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
Low
Income

(5)
High
Income

Baseline

Male

Female

-.182*
(.106)
.833

-.088
(.137)
.914

-.300**
(.152)
.740

.287***
(.076)
1.332

-0.107
(.228)
0.898

702.50
-1794.43
11,088

319.38
-1011.75
5,616

409.41
-860.49
5,472

2171.33
-8737.72
5,292

251.55
-616.28
5,796

The national CPI data in Indonesia is constructed based on CPI data available
at the city or district level, which represents all provinces in Indonesia. The number
of cities used to survey the cost of living has increased across the years. In 2000,
the CPI was based on surveys in 44 cities; then, it became 45 cities in 2004, 66
cities in 2008, and 82 cities in 2014. Although there is no CPI data at the provincial
level, I construct the provincial level CPI using data at the city and district level
by weighting cities that represent the province based on their GDP relative to
the provincial GDP. Table 5 presents the estimates of the minimum wage eﬀect
on educational investment, where the provincial real minimum wage variable is
constructed by dividing the provincial nominal minimum wage with the value of
provincial CPI each year to index the variable in terms of 2010 rupiah.
Based on the estimates using the nested logit model, the estimated eﬀect
of the minimum wage is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent
significance level for the full sample. It could be inferred that the odds are 0.83
to 1 (17 percent decrease in the odds) that parents will invest in their children’s
education with e times increase in the minimum wage. Meanwhile, when the
sample is disaggregated according to gender, the male sample regression
estimates do not show any significant eﬀect of minimum wage on educational
investment. However, among the female sample, there is evidence that a higher
minimum wage is linked to the likelihood of dropping out of school, significant
at the 5 percent significance level. The odds are 0.74 to 1 (26 percent decrease in
the odds) that parents will invest in their female children’s education with e (or
approximately 2.718) times increase in the minimum wage.
Furthermore, according to the household income disaggregation, the estimated
eﬀect of minimum wage is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent
significance level among low-income households. Using the odds ratio, I could
conclude that the odds are 1.33 to 1 (33 percent increase in the odds) that parents
will invest in their children’s education with e times increase in the minimum
wage. Meanwhile, when the same regression is carried out using the high-income
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sample, there is no significant eﬀect of minimum wage on educational investment.
The significant positive eﬀect of minimum wage legislation among the low-income
households indicates that an increase in the minimum wage is associated with a
higher probability to enrol at senior secondary school.
As explained in Section III, the provincial real minimum wage variable in
this paper is created by dividing the provincial nominal minimum wage with the
provincial GDP price deflator in each year to index the variable in terms of 2010
rupiah. However, the robustness-check regression results show no significant
diﬀerences between using the provincial GDP deflator and the CPI to convert
minimum wage to real terms. Both show significant positive eﬀects of the
minimum wage increase on the odds of senior secondary school enrolment among
the low-income households, and significant negative eﬀects for the full sample.
Moreover, the size of the odds ratio between the two types of regressions suggests
no significant dissimilarity.
F. Discussion and Limitations
In a pooled cross-sectional data setting, one is unable to fully control for timeinvariant unobservable characteristics like in a panel data setting. As a result,
both the time-variant and invariant unobservable characteristics, which aﬀect
the school choice, will lead to endogeneity bias if they are correlated with the
independent variables and are not directly controlled. Therefore, in this paper,
whenever possible, both the time-variant and invariant factors that have the
potential to cause endogeneity bias are controlled. Nevertheless, data on some
important control variables are unavailable, including data on the direct cost of
senior secondary education and a proxy for education quality, such as teachers’
salaries or the student-teacher ratio. There is a concern that the minimum wage
variable might be correlated with these unobservable factors, which would then
determine educational investment and lead to possible endogeneity bias. For
instance, if the direct cost of senior secondary education is positively correlated
with minimum wage, as this cost is part of the decent living standard consumption
bundle determining the minimum wage rate, the coeﬃcient of the minimum wage
variable will be biased upwards. Given the availability of data on these control
variables, this could improve the precision of the estimates in this paper.
Here, the parameters of the nested logit model are simultaneously estimated
using the standard maximum likelihood technique. Although maximisation using
maximum likelihood is sometimes challenging because the log-likelihood function
is not globally concave and even in concave areas is not close to a quadratic, the
nested logit model results are consistent (Brownstone and Small, 1989). With
simultaneous estimation, the nested logit model’s parameters are eﬃcient since all
information is utilised in the estimation of each parameter, and parameters that are
common across components are necessarily constrained to be equal (Train, 2009).
Nevertheless, in some cases, if problems arise in the simultaneous estimation,
nested logit models can be estimated in a sequential manner, which is performed
“bottom-up”. However, conforming to Train (2009), the sequential estimation of
nested logit models, while consistent, is not as eﬃcient as simultaneous estimation
by maximum likelihood. In the case of the nested logit model in this paper, there
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is no problem in the simultaneous estimation, and the log-likelihood has a unique
global maximum. Therefore, there is little reason to sequentially estimate the
nested logit model.
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper shows that Indonesia’s minimum wage legislation has a significantly
negative eﬀect on educational investment. Individuals are more likely to drop
out of senior secondary school following an increase in the minimum wage.
The estimates indicate that female children are more likely to drop out of school
and start working, either in the formal or informal sector, as the minimum wage
increases. Furthermore, after disaggregating the sample by household income,
I document that an increase in the minimum wage has no eﬀect on education
investment for individuals in high-income households, whereas it has a positive
effect for individuals in low-income households. Nevertheless, using these incomedivision results alone, I cannot conclude that the income eﬀect is the dominant
factor among low-income households since the positive effect of minimum wage
may be generated by a fall in the probability of obtaining low-skilled employment
that oﬀset the substitution eﬀect. Therefore, to separate the substitution and
income eﬀects, I estimate a regression incorporating an interaction term. The
results suggest that the substitution eﬀect is the dominant factor in explaining the
eﬀect of minimum wage legislation on human capital investment, both for lowand high-income households. This dominant and negative substitution eﬀect is
also discovered in most studies analysing the impact of minimum wage on human
capital investment, such as Neumark and Wascher (1994), Landon (1997), Pacheco
(2007), and Rice (2010).
This study shows that low-income households, particularly those with income
below 5 percent of the distribution, are more sensitive to changes in the minimum
wage. A positive income shock through an increase in the minimum wage for
the low-income household would make their budget constraint less binding,
resulting in a higher probability of investing in senior secondary education.
However, a positive income shock is not only in the form of an increase in the
minimum wage but may also be in the form of social assistance distributed to
ease households’ expenses. Therefore, to preserve the positive response among
low-income household, active government policy is critical to support poor
households to invest in their human capital, instead of saving for precautionary
reasons. In addition, the government should also ensure adequate coverage and
benefit levels of social assistance as they are vital in protecting human capital and
building resilience. Moreover, a well-functioning, adaptive, and responsive social
protection system is a prerequisite to protect poor and vulnerable households
against risks and shocks along the lifecycle. Such social protection system would
minimise negative coping behaviours (e.g., giving up productive investment in
order to maintain basic minimum consumption) and contribute to beneficiaries’
human and financial capital in the long run.
Besides, the empirical results in this study suggest that an increase in the
minimum wage thwarts recent government eﬀorts to promote student enrolment
in senior secondary school. Consequently, the impact on human capital investment
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decisions of individuals should be taken into account when considering the costs
and benefits of introducing or raising the minimum wage. Policy interventions
may be crucial to encourage students to complete senior secondary school, mainly
to counteract the negative impact of the minimum wage legislation on educational
investment and to avert the negative consequences in terms of long-run economic
development of labour force with a low level of human capital. Moreover, the
results indicate that the success of a government programme will depend at least
in part on other programmes. Therefore, inter-sectoral policy coordination should
be improved to enable synergy or at least prevent overlapping and conflicts of
sectoral policies, which is increasingly vital due to the growing complexity of
many policy issues. The government needs to identify and mitigate divergences
between sectoral priorities and policies and promote mutually supporting actions
across sectors and institutions.
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